Immediacy and Mediation in Husserl

Husserl is a transitional figure. His modernism is evident in his notion of being as essential, his acceptance of truth as universal, necessary, and indubitable, and his search for certain foundations for philosophy. His philosophy may be the completion of the project to develop a rigorous method to provide an indubitable ground for philosophy started by Descartes and of the concern to provide a foundation for the sciences, emphasized by Kantians. He is part of the deeper tradition that views universality and necessity as conditions for truly scientific or philosophical knowledge. He contributed to the emergence of post modernism through the mediation of existentialism by winning conscious experience as a legitimate area for philosophical inquiry and a transformation of the philosophical field to one of concrete experience. A key contribution is his recognition that epistemological issues can be resolved by understanding conscious operations. His breakthrough into phenomenological experience provided the horizon within which his emphasis on essence was repudiated or devalued in later philosophies, which shifted the fundamental themes from method and knowledge to freedom and action, from certain, universal knowledge to an understanding of historicity utilizing hermeneutics or the archeology of knowledge and finding in the transformation of meaning the absence of the absolute. He was one of a quartet of Germanic thinkers who, in the early twentieth century, set much of our century’s philosophical horizon, the other three being Frege, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger.
Though he may be the last in the Cartesian tradition of searching for a method founded on absolute certainty, neither he nor the others dealt fully with the Kantian problematic regarding knowing transcendent things in themselves, which we will consider in a critical discussion of immediacy and mediation in Husserl. These relate to two notions central to his philosophy, immanence and the transcendent.

Immanence and the Transcendent

Husserl’s phenomenology is a descriptive science of essences. At a first approximation it is descriptive because it is an understanding of the essences of immanent experiences. Immanent experience is fully given and immediate. It is contrasted with the transcendent which is constituted via immanent experiences and is mediated. The transcendent is present in its absence since it is intended but not fully given. The transcendental, as immanent operations, is fully present. The transcendental ego is an exception, not being fully given.

These relations are exemplified in Husserl’s analysis of perception and his notion of the thing. When we perceive a thing, we perceive it via perspectives. We never have a single perception which provides the thing as a whole. Rather the thing for us is a unity which partially is an X which can be understood and dealt with from new perspectives. As a unity it is constituted, or synthesized from immanent experiences of it. As intended it has an open horizon for interaction. This is the core of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the primacy of perception as opening an horizon of possibility for an ecstatic freedom.

The immanent experiences are the perspectives which are not given perspectivally, but all at once. As such, they are immediate and given, self-evident and
indubitable. The self evidence is in the manner of a self-giving, indubitable evidence. In this sense, it is an absolute, something which can be used as a ground for judgment.

Essences

Phenomenology is an understanding of these experiences through insights which yield their essence. These insights are of the universal and necessary. In our understanding of the immanent operations constituting the thing, we grasp the necessity of the thing being given perspectivaly, the necessity of it being transcendent, the necessity of it being synthetic and the necessity of it having an open horizon. However, this does not establish its universality, the fact that all possible perceiving must be this way. That is established through imaginative eidetic variation, where all possible types of perceptions are imagined.

This is not an instantaneous process. There are emerging grades of clarity as understanding progresses. When understanding is perfectly clear, when there are no remaining obscurities, then we have it. The essence is self given in an eidetic intuition. We grasp the necessity of all possible perceiving being perspectival. We have the essence of a transcendental operation, a transcendental essence. It is descriptive because it presents how operations are performed and it is of an immanent experience. The transcendent, on the other hand, cannot be fully described because it is not fully given.

The essence is also absolute and is known with certainty. Its absoluteness has at least two sources. First, it has a type of self subsistent existence. Just as mathematical relationships and geometrical theorems exist independently of the psychological state of the knower and follow their own internal logic, which indicates they are not mental creations, phenomenological essences exhibit an internal necessity and an independence
of the minds that intuit them. The latter point is established by considering that essences, as universal, exhibit an independence of the individual, particular and contingent. For Husserl, they can exist even if the particulars of which they are the essence do not.

Phenomenology, then, as an essential science is an *a priori* science. The second meaning of absolute is that the immediate phenomenological essences can be used as primordial grounds, or evidence, for judgments. In turn, this relates to their certainty. To understand how eidetic insight is certain, or apodictic, we need to understand the role of the reductions or epochés.

**Role of the Reductions**

The development of phenomenology has two aspects: establishing that essences exist in themselves and are not psychological constructs, and the reductions (p. 164, *Ideas*). The former is established in the *Logical Investigations* which argues against a psychologism that would explain essences as products of consciousness, or the psyche, and for the absoluteness of essences. The reductions were implicitly and imperfectly performed at that time and became objectified and maturely performed in *Ideas*. Refinements and restatements were made throughout Husserl’s later works.

The epoches are shifts in attention, interest and questioning from within the horizons of the natural attitude, the factual sciences and the other eidetic sciences (geometry, mathematics, logic). The shift includes suspension of judgments of the factuality of the things and events correlative to these attitudes.

The “unconcern” with factuality has a two-fold purpose. The first is that our concern is not with the particular, contingent and factual, but with the essential. This does not mean that we are not interested in the particular. We are interested in
understanding it. Yet that understanding is not of it as factual, but as essence. We use the experience of particulars to understand the essence that applies to all. Husserl’s emphasis on imaginative variation to establish the universal rather than on experience to verify fact bears this out. Thus, phenomenology does not yield knowledge of conscious operations as one set of facts within a pregiven world of other facts. This is the position of psychology. Rather, phenomenology focuses on the essential to establish the a priori possibilities of operations, establishing the universal and necessary conditions for all possible worlds, replacing the Kantian emphasis on categories with a descriptive essential science of consciousness. As geometry stands to natural science, so phenomenology would stand to all factual knowledge.

The second is that we are not engaged in the concerns of these attitudes, which has a three fold effect. The first is that we carry no presuppositions regarding facts into our inquiry. The second is that the factual, indeed, everything that has been suspended, remains available, but in a different way. It is available immanently as consciously intended, that is, as a correlate of conscious operations. The possibility of these suspensions rests on the essence of intentionality. Third, conscious operations become explicitly available with their correlates as a new field of experience and inquiry, as phenomena. This shift from the factual, especially the natural standpoint of everyday life, can be disorienting. The shift to concern with essences and the ideal adds a sense of what Husserl terms the irreal to the project.

The shift in focus to the experiential or phenomenal without presuppositions, enables us to attend to the immediately self given, empirically intuited pure experience from which we can intuit the corresponding self-given (self evident) pure essence. The
pure, presuppositionless, self-given immediacy is the last link in understanding the essential possibility of truth of eidetic insight, which is not the mere truth of fact, but apodictic truth, universal and necessary. The operations cannot be otherwise and the possible horizons of consciousness are fundamentally grounded and secured.

The reduction is meant to be a permanent achievement, becoming an habitual orientation, a personal transformation that opens up a broader and deeper horizon for inquiry and living. It is primarily a philosophical differentiation of consciousness. The failure of philosophers to gain the pure phenomenal experience and to understand how it grounds all apophantic truth (truth of statements) is the source of many philosophical mistakes and paradoxes.

The major one is naturalism, which attempts to provide a causal account of consciousness and knowing, reducing them ultimately to the explanations of physics and chemistry. Proponents start from a world of facts, using them as absolute grounds for judgment when they in fact are relative to consciousness and to the more fundamental grounds of immanence. In this way, they overlook the fact that their theory is only possible on the basis of an absolute that they wish to relativize by reducing it to the absolutes of physics and chemistry. In effect, they have implicitly performed a *reductio ad absurdem* by eliminating the grounds for asserting the truth of their theory.

Husserl differentiates being into two types, absolute and relative. The immanent as immediate and self given, and the essences thereof, are absolute, while the transcendent and mediate is relative. The relative can be explained legitimately in terms of the absolute, but the reverse does not hold. Thus, naturalism, in Husserl’s framework, is philosophically naive and mistaken from the start.
Starting from facts, even if they are true, provides naturalism with a less secure foundation. It is possible that the facts could be otherwise. As factual, there is nothing to guarantee that the understanding is correct. In addition, experience of the transcendent can be illusory. The transcendent, then, is dubitable in principle. However, the experience of an illusion is not an illusion. It is given immediately as it is and can be understood as essentially different from transcendental experience of the real even though it can carry with it the conviction of truth. One sees repeated here the core of the Cartesian claim regarding the indubitability of the experience of doubting. We can sum up the \textit{apodictic} nature of phenomenology by noting that if we are presuppositionlessly focused on understanding immanent, or fully given, experience and our understanding is complete, it will be indubitable. As intuited, it will be given as it is, being self evident and immediate. (NB: Discussion in \textbf{Insight} that if the image is correct, the understanding will be correct. The error is not in the understanding, but in the image. p. 431 - 432)

This explains why the epoches are reductions. The transcendent is reduced to the immanent, not to change its status, or eliminate it as truly real, but to reveal its essence. Thus, phenomenology is a new type of formal science. It is not a deductive rationalism, mathematics or logic. Rather it grasps transcendental essences in their essential interrelationships as these are presaged in empirical intuition and self given in eidetic intuition. By opening up the phenomenal as the legitimate field for philosophy, all regions of being can be philosophically understood in a new way and in a new context, but with the Aristotilian criteria for a science as universally and necessarily true intact, with the demands of radical questioning met, and with doubt eliminated. Critical appraisal of his position requires an excursus into the notion of truth.
Truth

Husserl was influenced in at least two major ways by Brentano. The first was Brentano’s notion of intentionality which he adopted from the scholastic tradition and the second was his notion of truth. Brentano criticized the correspondence theory of truth as requiring two judgments. The first is the judgment that something is and the second is a judgment comparing the first with what is known. If this were the case we would enter an infinite regress. We will critique this view of the correspondence theory later. Our concern here is to understand the roots of Husserl’s view of eidetic insight as grounding a scientific philosophy. Rather than truth being a correspondence between knowing and what is known, for Brentano it is the evident, which is yielded in an insightful judgment.

(53) The evident is certain. (58) Since an insightful judgment is the occasion for certainty it is not surprising that Brentano dismisses any attempt to postulate rules which may be followed to arrive at the truth. Rules need to be interpreted and accepted and, lest one get into an infinite regress of rules, that acceptance requires a personal act such as Brentano’s insightful judgment.

Excursus into truth.

There are two major issues met via his view. The first is meeting two criteria for truth as set out by Brentano and the second is addressing the Kantian problematic of the unknowability of the thing in itself. Notion of immanence and of verstehen.

Critical Issues

There are many interesting and important criticisms that can be made of phenomenology. The basic shortcomings I would like to consider are the devaluation of
explanatory and scientific knowledge compared to knowledge of the immanent, and of factual, contingent knowledge that in principle can be wrong, with knowledge of essences as universally and necessarily true. Combined with an essentialism which places the transcendental as essence and the ego as transcendental in a form of opposition to the factual, contingent and real, phenomenology, though a significant advance, is neither fully concrete nor fully explanatory and, thus, cannot appropriate "foundational" knowledge of the immanent as explanatory and transcendent. Due to time constraints, I will focus primarily on the issue of phenomenological descriptions versus explanation and self-transcendence in knowing within the context of understanding knowledge of the thing in itself or being in itself.

Husserl’s view of the thing in itself, though not fully complete, is a major advancement from Kantian thought and could easily correct many naturalistic and epistemological misconceptions in current philosophies. The thing in itself for Kant is the unknown X which is, in a sense, behind appearances and is partially their cause. It cannot be known in itself because we cannot, in principle, have an empirical intuition of it as it is in itself. For Husserl, the thing in itself is precisely that of which we have empirical intuitions. The notion that we do not is based on a view of experience as representative of, or a sign of, the thing in itself. The notion of a sign requires two acts of perceiving where in the perception of a thing there is only one. The first is the perception of the sign and the second is the perception of that which the sign indicates. The sign itself is a qualitatively different type of thing than that which it signifies. Likewise, representation implies that the same thing can be given to us in two different ways. Part of the problem for Husserl is that things are given in two different ways, but they are
conflated by those who do not think we experience things in themselves. These two ways are empirical and formal intuition. The content of formal intuition is unimaginable. Since the scientific understanding of the thing in itself in physics and chemistry is to a large extent mathematical, the thing in itself is interpreted as an absolute that is not given in experience. Rather, experience, as caused by physiological and psychic processes is subjective and a “distorting” or relativizing of the thing in itself. Hence, it is merely appearance where the notion of appearance is that of appearance of … where the of …, due to the essential nature of appearance, is not given as such. This implicitly reduces the essential to the level of the experience, a tacit error which is compounded by trying to imagine essences and presenting diagrams and pictures of them in text books.

In fact, as Husserl’s analysis of perception shows, the experiential already is transcendent. For him this is the field that science tries to explain by understanding the connections among experiences. Science both starts from experience in its questioning and returns to it for verification, or, more generally, it emerges from and returns to the life world. The Kantian noumenon, then, is found in the phenomenon, and Husserl can claim that Phenomenology is a return to the things themselves.

While Husserl’s understanding is more parsimonious, concrete and reflective of scientific understanding than the “objectivist” view of the thing in itself, he in fact makes the complementary error of not considering scientific knowledge and reality as absolute since it is not immanent, primordial or pure, immediate and certain. In its justification it ultimately is reduced to immanence and the essences of immanence. It also is secondary to the life world in which it has a valuable but limited predictive role. In The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology he strikes a positivistic stance.

This actually intuited, actually experienced and experienceable world, in which practically our whole life takes place, remains unchanged as what it is, in its own essential structure and its own concrete causal style, whatever we may do with or without techniques. Thus it is also not changed by the fact that we invent a particular technique, the geometrical and Galilean technique which is called physics. What do we actually accomplish through this technique? Nothing but prediction extended to infinity. (p.51)

Now the reality is that these views need to be reconciled. The transcendent, to be fully transcendent, must exist absolutely. It must exist in itself and not merely in relation to consciousness. The failure to explain this rests in a confusion of the conditions for knowing, which explains the transcendent in relation to consciousness and knowing, with the conditions for the existence of the transcendent. His notion of being as absolute and relative is a distinction within knowledge, of being as known, not in itself. It is the failure to fully work out and reconcile these two views which legitimates interpretations of Husserl as an idealist, though he acknowledged that the factual sciences are of a reality that is pre-existent and independent of our existence. His notions of judgment and of truth are limiting conditions for this effort.

Judgment and Truth

Judgment for Husserl is related to doxic modes, or what we may call degrees of commitment to, or belief in the reality of the judged. For example, we have varying degrees of doubt which can be understood in relation to our experiences of certainty. Judgment, however, is secondary to primordial intuitive dator and eidetic givenness, since these provide the ultimate evidence for judgment. Judgment also seems to retain the synthetic role it has in most philosophies since its content, as propositional, is
pregiven, and the proposition is relational, attributive, implicational, and so on. This contrasts with the critical realist view where synthesis is the result of understanding, and judgment, proper, is not synthetic. Rather it is the affirmation or denial of what is understood. Reflective understanding is synthetic in a sense, but its synthesis is the linking of the evidence to the proposition (or its equivalent in skillful, non verbal, or implicit operations) and the recognition that the conditions for the judgment are fulfilled. This notion of judgment acknowledges factual knowledge, and knowledge in general, as intelligibility of a different quality subsuming the essential and empirical, which are not real for us in the fully human sense until we make judgments. For Husserl, on the contrary what is most real is given prior to judgment and is overlooked in the natural attitude, the factual and formal sciences and so on. There is truth to the point that reality is pregiven in some sense. That would be worked out in understanding the notion of being, which, in a dialogue with phenomenology, would best be done via a critical understanding of Heidegger.

With the notion of truth as immediate and as coincidental with the self-givenness of immanent conscious correlates, the notion of truth as the correspondence of knowing with being in judgment appears derivative and limited. It assumes that two elements which already are pregiven, the proposition and the reality to which it must correspond, must be related to one another. The truth of the relation is founded on the pregiven elements, which in fact constitute the evidence and point to the more primordial truth which constitutes the horizon for judgment. Truth as correspondence, for Husserl, is understood within the natural standpoint which naively assumes the independent reality of the world and the things in it. However, if judgment is not synthetic, and is a simple
yes or no, then it is not relating a proposition to its correlate in the world, it is not relating the universal to the particular or the essential to the experiencial. Neither is it a matching or a comparison. It does not relate anything to anything. Rather it is the positing of existence or occurrence or of a formal truth based on the recognition that the conditions for judgment are fulfilled. It does not even require that we know what those conditions are. Rather the fulfillment is actualized operationally. On this model, nothing is for us in the fully human sense until we judge. Thus, there is no pregiven content or actuality for us to which the judgment can correspond because the affirmed being does not exist for us prior to the judgment. But once we have a sufficiently developed notion of objectivity, which requires a critical mass of relevant judgments, we can know that knowing is related to, or corresponds to, or is intentionally identical with reality. Truth for Husserl, then, is self-givenness, versus truth as a relation between knowing and being, where the relationship is known at least tacitly in the judgment.

With his notion of truth, has Husserl fully appropriated the essence of intentionality? More than it being the relation of operations to contents, the notion of consciousness as consciousness of…, it makes possible knowledge of being in itself, where the known is transcendent and identical with the reality known. There are two key elements of intentional existence. The first is exemplified in Aristotle where understanding can be identical with the object without being identical with its matter. The second is found in St. Thomas where knowing can be identical with the actuality of the object without being the object. The first, of course, occurs in understanding and the second in judgment. Rather than finding absolute objectivity in judgment, Husserl finds it in the self-givenness of essences and the correlates of primordial dator intuition. That
they are self-given indicates their independence of intuition and other psychological operations as causes of them and accounts, partially, for knowledge of them as objective. So in a non-Husserlian sense they are transcendent since they are independent of the particular intuition. The confusing aspect is that in the notion of eidetic intuition the affirmation of the actual and the grasp of the essential are identical and there is a positing by Husserl of the necessary, essential relation of being to consciousness. So it is not that Husserl does not understand the essence of intentionality, it is that the essential as absolute has priority over the factual as relative. Because he is prescinding from the factual in the reductions, consciousness’ relation to being cannot be thought as factual and contingent, but must be thought as essential. Given his drive for absolute certainty in positing the essential “horizon” of all possible worlds, the essential is thought as universal and necessary. In an explanatory approach, the notion of self givenness is revealed as a mere metaphor, for nowhere is an explanation provided for the self-giving, or truth, of the essence, other than the fact, or occurrence, of intuition. Of course, for Heidegger, the metaphor is apt and the lack of an explanation is comprehensible since truth is concealing unconcealment.

Reconciling Explanation and Phenomenological Description

The reconciliation of the explanatory and phenomenological viewpoints can only occur explanatorily. In fact, Husserl’s reduction of the transcendent to the immanent is an explanation of the transcendent in relation to the immanent and vice versa. Husserl acknowledges the former but not the latter because explanation for him is not primordial but mediate. His emphasis on essence and universal possibilities led him to reject genetic accounts of knowing. A complete theory of human knowing would be in terms of the
material and operational conditions for its emergence as well as its structure. Knowing would be placed in the universe where things are related to one another. Reconciliation of the causal with the “formal” understanding of knowing would occur in providing an adequate model for understanding emergence and the relation between mind and brain. This also would reconcile the natural and human sciences with one another and both with philosophy, as complementary with one another. (It also may provide the basis for understanding hermeneutics in its proper interpretative role, situating the linguistic interpretation of meaning within the broader context of human understanding as insight and language within its full pragmatic context.)

This, I think, is a noble project, but it is precisely the project that phenomenology and existentialism reject. The rejection is based on a failure to understand how being for us and being in itself, or the thing for us and the thing in itself, can be understood within a single, explanatory, transcendental viewpoint that accounts for the universe of being as explained. This would include a concrete, factual, and personal understanding of conscious operations and horizons, which would be subsumed within the broader explanatory framework. Husserl failed to acknowledge the full explanatory scope of his own thought with the consequent failure to grasp that because one can explanatorily grasp transcendental relationships, one can just as well grasp others with similar legitimacy. More fundamentally, this requires a shift from essential to factual knowledge and a recognition that factual knowledge can be certain, though in principle, it can be wrong. It is a failure to understand that viewpoints do not have to be self centered, or, more to the point, that in many cases the intelligibility of X can be known without
considering the relation of the knower to X. These would be clear cases of self-transcendence.

Knowledge is of the transcendent as absolute, and it is within a particular viewpoint because it is intentional. This is the heart of the “paradox” of self-transcendence. Judgment is simply the last increment in a process. The independence of the object (in the broad sense of object of questioning) is implicit in the understanding of it, which need not include an understanding of the knower. It is “structural”. Likewise, the question is put within a horizon in which what is questioned is constituted already as independent, or as a to-be-known, which, if known, would be independent. This also is structural. The philosophical confusion occurs in knowing consciousness, because being for us and being in itself are coincidental in these instances. That is, there is an immediate relation to consciousness in itself via consciousness which corresponds to Husserl’s notion of immanence. The fuller relationship is knowledge of consciousness which is a self-mediation by the immediately given operations. We need to work through the issues of being-in-itself being for us without thinking that the meaning of being is to be related to consciousness. The resolution, again, is that the conditions for knowing and the conditions for being are different.

Once that is accepted, then there is no paradox in explaining the emergence of consciousness as intentional and autonomous. Autonomy would correspond to absoluteness in Husserl’s sense. It is by establishing the autonomy of consciousness that one refutes naturalism, which Husserl has done by understanding transcendental consciousness as having an irreducible role in providing and understanding evidence.

Critique of Phenomenological Description
Let us consider another critical issue. How immanent, immediate and certain is phenomenological description? The descriptive component of explicating how conscious operations are performed becomes explanatory if they are not in a continuous stream. Then we need to relate separately experienced operations to one another, and this may require mediation. If we rely upon memory we lose certainty since memory can be incorrect even if the immanent incorrect memory cannot be doubted itself. Husserl’s “constructivist” notion of the transcendental as based on immediate truth breaks down in its own account as phenomenological description becomes more structural and explanatory and less immediate and, consequently, is pushed to become factual in needing to empirically verify understanding on the basis of data that in principle can be incorrect, instead of having the understanding be given fully and certainly with reference to only the immediate immanent experience.

Two other points can be made. First, Husserl’s account is, in many instances, neither universal nor necessary. Second, Husserl’s questions and insights are conditioned by unacknowledged insights and judgments. The reductions, which presind from judgments of fact, do not presind from prior explicit understanding either. Thus, they do not yield a presuppositionless context for inquiry. These items require further development.

A final critical issue regards the selectivity of phenomenological attention and, derivatively, questioning. Immanent experiences may be self given, but the true experiential field is complex and attentiveness to it is selective. Now the attentive correlate is given along with attentiveness, and our insight may only be of that correlate. But how do we know that we have grasped the full meaning of the correlate? Its meaning
may be subsumed within a more complex structure that is not given, but can only be understood through multiple insights into multiple immanent experiences which need to be related to one another in further insights. As understood within the structure its meaning may be different than when understood in isolation, since the isolated instance was really partial. The structure, *per se*, is never fully present. Because it consists of multiple operations it cannot be given immediately. Moreover, its performance in any single actualization can be unsystematic, historical, and discontinuous. It also may operate in multiple instances concurrently, some of which are unattended to in the attending selection of the original immanent correlate, and many of which are at different stages in the unfolding of the structure. Any ‘description’ of this process would be highly relational, or explanatory. Though an explanatory model can be developed by which the key operations can be described in the sense of laying out their ideal order, it would be misleading to describe this model as self given when it really is the result of complex mediate processes and when its application requires the complementary operations of having insights into particular instances which grasp the manners in which the model relates or fails to relate to experience. This is not to say that Husserl overlooks the complexity of consciousness and the difficulty in understanding it. In fact, in his understanding of complex sets of operations and the sedimentation of meaning, this is what he is moving towards, but his emphasis on the immediacy of absolute truth and meaning and their foundational role as certain in principle limits the process by cutting off factual explanation as a fruitful model. In explaining consciousness there is a transcendence of description where relationships are of prime importance. Just as the transcendent for Husserl is not fully present, so is the immanent in its intelligibility.
Thus, in knowing consciousness there is a transcendence of the given and of essences that are grasped as understanding develops. This development is not merely of ideas becoming clearer and more complete, but of the discovery of relationships that are not given and that do not exist in all possible, or conceivable, similar instances, but which account for intentional constitution of the real. In this sense, knowledge of the immanent is transcendent in the sense that it is complex and factual and that what is known is what it is independently of the particular knowing of it, even though that knowing may be of itself in act, that is, absolute identity. It is the failure of Twentieth Century philosophy to attain this level of understanding of the transcendent which accounts for the prevalent understanding of knowledge in terms of belief and decision. This level of understanding cannot be achieved unless understanding is explanatory.

Foundations

Philosophy, then, is not foundational in the sense of providing the grounds for the other sciences. One type of knowledge does not ground another. It can explain another, but it does not provide it with foundations since different types of knowing have their own evidence and modes of operation. Rather it is complementary. Philosophy can explain those modes of operation as adequate or inadequate self-transcendence, as knowing or opinion or belief, as authentic or inauthentic, as contributing to spiritual development or not, and so on. But philosophers should not dictate to scientists, for example. Rather our role is to resolve philosophical questions regarding science. The value for the scientist is that these questions will be encountered in doing science and the scientist will have somewhere to turn for assistance when they need to engage in philosophy just as we turn to science to understand what particular things and events and
situations are. If we narrowly interpret foundations as the conditions for judgment, then, since there are no privileged conditions for truth, foundations become defined in terms of function, or operations, rather than content, and we can reconcile the core of truth found in historicism, relativism, post modernism and so on resting on the rejection of foundations as formal with an absolute objectivity indeterminate in scope. If we broaden the notion to all constitutive operations within a factual and contingent, rather than formal, context, we can incorporate the concerns of Husserl’s phenomenology with the current emphasis on the concrete, contingent, unsystematic and free.

The full inquiry would account for the unity of experience which Husserl equated with temporality. In a “self-deconstructing” statement in Ideas, which also foreshadows Heidegger, he says:

The transcendental “Absolute” that we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not ultimate; it is something which in a wholly profound and unique sense constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute. (Ideas, pg. 216)

Perhaps its source is itself as emergent self-mediation. As emergent, its origins would be “concealed” since the conditions do not fully explain the emergent. Then the immediate always would be a mediated immediacy, where immediacy is relative to operations, and the Husserlian notions of truth, the immanent, and the absolute would need to be rethought explanatorily, integrating spiritual operations with the biological and psychological conditions for the constitution of the “immediate”.